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The “computation” symposium presents the reflections of thinkers from many sectors of computing
on the fundamental question in the background of everything we do as computing professionals.
While many of us have too many immediate tasks to allow us time for our own deep reflection, we do
appreciate when others have done this for us. Peter Freeman points out, by analogy, that as citizens
of democracies we do not spend a lot of time reflecting on the question, “What is a democracy.” But
from time to time we find it helpful to see what philosophers and political scientists are saying about
the context in which we act as citizens.
1. INTRODUCTION
This symposium has been a provocative learning experience
for authors, and editors, and hopefully will also be for readers.
I would like to share some of what I have learned in working
with the authors. My general conclusions are grouped into three
sections:
• Points of major agreement
• Questions not fully resolved
• Interactive systems
The first section lists the points in which everyone seems to
be in agreement. In my opening statement, I expressed concerns
that developments in non-terminating computation, analog
computation, and natural computation may require rethinking
the basic definitions of computation. The authors agree that
these developments easily fit within existing understandings of
computing. The second section highlights areas where some of
the authors disagree among themselves. Further reflection will
be required to resolve those issues. I’m sure some of them seem
pretty esoteric! The third, and final, section focuses on a class
of computational systems called interactive or reactive systems,
which have been around for a long time but are fundamentally
different from the computational systems envisioned by
Turing.
2. POINTS OF MAJOR AGREEMENT
Computation is a process. Every author distinguishes the
machine or algorithm from the process that the machine or
algorithm generates. Dennis Frailey makes the argument most
directly and wonders if every process is also a computation.
In analogies: the machine is a car, the desired outcome is the
driver’s destination, and the computation is the journey taken
by the car and driver to the destination.
Computational model matters. A computational model is
a specification of a method for data representation and a
mechanism that transforms those representations toward a
desired outcome. Here are some examples. A Turing machine
is an abstract model of a sequential digital computer with
finite, but unbounded, memory. A finite state machine is a
model for bounded-memory process controllers. A Petri Net
is a model for a network of asynchronous parallel tasks.
String rewriting rules are a model for DNA translation. For
analysis and design, we want models that reflect the domain
closely and enable prediction. Part of the work of scientists and
engineers is to discover or design new models that deal with new
domains.
Many important computations are natural. Although
our tradition attunes our thinking to machine-generated
computations, there are now numerous examples of natural
ones. Dave Bacon notes this for physics, Melanie Mitchell
for biology, and Erol Gelenbe for other natural processes.
Prominent examples of natural computation include DNA
translation, brain processes, quantum information, and social
network games.
Many important computations are non-terminating. The
original definitions in the 1930s associated computation with
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terminating algorithms. This was understandable because the
initial focus was on automatic calculation of mathematical
functions; a non-terminating calculation would, by definition,
not be able to calculate a number. In the 1960s, operating system
designers invented the term “process” for a non-terminating
computation. Many services of operating systems -such as
network protocols, web servers, and login sessions-are designed
to continue indefinitely. They cannot do their work if they
terminate prematurely. Today, everyone seems to accept that
some computations terminate and others do not. In his 1986
book Finite and Infinite Games, James Carse says: “A finite
game is played for the purpose of winning, an infinite game for
the purpose of continuing the play.” Developers who focus on
generating a result then stopping are designing a finite game;
those who focus on keeping the process going indefinitely are
designing an infinite game.
Many important computations are continuous. Our famil-
iarity with the Turing model inclines us to think of computation
as discrete. However, physical implementations of automatic
computation use continuous signals. We discretize the states of
the signals to improve the reliability of detection and interpreta-
tion in the face of imprecise measurement, roundoff errors, and
noise. Discretized systems may be called “covertly continuous”
because the continuous signals used to represent quantities are
normally hidden. Some systems are overtly continuous, such as
mathematical models of heat flow, magnetic pole phase change,
or galaxy collision. Joe Traub details the methods of analysis
used to predict running times of these models on digital com-
puters. Even though the analytic methods may differ, contin-
uous systems do not have more computing power than digital
systems.
Computational thinking can be defined. The term “algorith-
mic thinking” was used in the 1950s to describe an essential
difference between problem solving in computing and in other
fields. The term “computational thinking” was used in the 1980s
to describe the new way of doing science enabled by super-
computers. These terms stayed quietly in the background until
2006, when Jeanette Wing popularized them as part of what
everyone should know about computing. Her account did not
precisely define computational thinking and left many educa-
tors asking “what is computational thinking?” Several authors
have provided their one-sentence answers to this. I said: “Com-
putational thinking is an approach to problem solving that repre-
sents the problem as an information process relative to a com-
putational model (which may have to be invented or discov-
ered) and seeks an algorithmic solution.” Al Aho offered the
shortest: “We consider computational thinking to be the thought
processes involved in formulating problems so their solutions
can be represented as computational steps and algorithms.” We
should avoid the trap of concluding that computational thinking
defines computing. For example, computational thinking is not
the same as “computational doing,” which is the actual work
of computing professionals as they make computation real and
effective in their worlds.
3. QUESTIONS NOT FULLY RESOLVED
Is the Turing machine the only acceptable reference
model? The Turing machine became the reference model for
computation in the 1930s. The Church-Turing thesis of the same
era held that any effective method for computing a function
could be realized by an appropriate Turing machine. Since
then, most new proposals for computational models have been
compared to the Turing machine. No one has found a model
that can compute a function that a Turing machine cannot.
For this reason, by the 1960s, the Turing model was broadly
accepted as a reference model. Lance Fortnow takes a strong
position for the Turing model, which he believes models the
process by which numbers are computed, and is fundamentally
the same whether or not the machine terminates. John Conery
says that, as in the Turing model, computation is the series of
state-transitions in a process that represent states and inputs
symbolically. He relaxes the Turing model a bit by allowing
state transitions not controlled by algorithms, as in natural
or biological computation. However, as the importance of
computation has flourished in many fields, the ability of the
Turing machine model to predict running times of computations
has been mixed. It is often found that computational models
closely matched to the problems in a domain are more accurate
predictors. Joe Traub reports this is true for computational
science, which deals with continuous problems, while Jeff
Buzen reports the same for models that predict throughput
and response time of computing systems under workload
uncertainty. Some of the authors argue that the Turing machine
is a fine reference model; others argue that alternative models
(even if Turing equivalent) are better predictors for performance
in specific domains.
Is information observable? Most of the authors define
computation as some sort of transformation of information,
but do not provide a clear definition of information. Paul
Rosenbloom goes to some length to define information and
its relationship to computation. Dave Bacon says information
is part of the quantum structure of the universe, but no
one has directly observed it. Ruzena Bajcsy says that some
information is manifested in physical measurements such as
voltages, sound waves, or electron spins, and other information
is synthesized from human thoughts such as mathematical
models; we come to know the latter when they are expressed
in symbols and language conveyed by the former. I admit to
considerable confusion myself on this. The formal definitions of
data (objective symbols) and information (subjective meaning)
do not help me design computers and algorithms. I think
it is possible to engineer computers and analyze their
performance and limitations without having to resolve the
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meaning question. Still, what information is remains an open
question.
Is all computation physical? The term “representation” means
a pattern of symbols standing for something. The “standing
for” part is a statement of social convention: We have come
to collective agreements on what various patterns mean to
us. We usually think of the representation as something
recorded in a medium where others can inspect it, and meaning
as the mental state evoked by a representation. Yet it is
possible to define representations as abstract languages and
algorithms as a means to impose orderings on the strings
in languages, and then answer questions about the limits of
machines that recognize the languages or their running time
when analyzing strings. Paul Rosenbloom argues that some
computation is purely abstract. On the other hand, Dave Bacon
says that computation is a construction of nature to overcome
uncertainties in unreliable information processes. This question
remains unresolved.
4. INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS
The computing theory community has defined “reactive
systems” as a class of computational systems that model
interactive computations. These systems receive ongoing inputs
and provide ongoing outputs. Their purpose is to maintain
interactions indefinitely, rather than to compute functions and
stop. They are a form of Carse’s infinite game mentioned earlier.
Reactive (interactive) systems are not new; they have been
studied since the 1950s by operating system engineers and later
by network and database system engineers. Those engineers,
however, were more interested in the models as means to
design well-behaved and predictable systems, not as models
of computation. The field of operating systems has been a rich
source of computational models of reactive systems. Examples
include Petri Nets (1939), cooperating sequential processes
(Dijkstra 1968), schemata (Karp-Miller 1969), partially ordered
task sets (Coffman-Denning 1973), communicating processes
(Hoare 1978), and operational queueing networks (Buzen-
Denning 1977). These models have been used to analyze
race conditions, process creation and deletion, asynchronous
communication, determinacy, deadlock, performance, and fault
resistance. It should be noted that Turing machine models
address none of these phenomena. In this symposium, Peter
Wegner argues that interactive systems are fundamentally
different from Turing models, and Al Aho agrees. A Turing
machine begins with a finite input and aims to produce a finite
output.An interactive system, on the other hand, has an ongoing
input that continues indefinitely and produces an ongoing
output that also continues indefinitely. All the input to a Turing
machine is presented before it starts, but interactive systems
constantly receive new inputs after they start, and they produce
outputs before all inputs are received. Interactive systems may
have many asynchronous channels of input and output. The
input-output relationship of an interactive system is not a
function, as it is in a Turing machine. Even when an interactive
system’s outputs can be functionally related to its inputs, many
inputs may be non-computational-such as humans inputting
their decisions. These differences lead some authors to doubt
whether Turing machines can simulate interactive systems or,
in other words, whether interactive systems are equivalent to
Turing machines. On top of all this, an interactive system
may dynamically change configuration while it is computing-
for example, adding or deleting nodes or links in a network.
In designing an interactive system such as the Internet, the
designer is interested in issues such as capacity, throughput, and
response time-none of which can be evaluated with a Turing
machine. In this symposium, Jeff Buzen provides a model
of reactive/interactive systems for evaluating such questions
when the workloads that drive the system are uncertain, while
retaining the underlying deterministic system of computing
machines.
5. CONCLUSIONS
I was struck by the clarity that comes when we make explicit
the computational model we are working with. The Turing
machine model is not the most convenient for many domains
even though theoretically it is equivalent with every convenient
model in its ability to define functions. In solving real problems,
we work with computational models (or invent new ones)
that are convenient and appropriate for the domain. There is
an emerging consensus that reactive systems are models of
interactive computation and are different from Turing modeled
systems. I noted a considerable amount of agreement on what
issues are settled and what issues remain open.When I took polls
about what is computer science and computing in the mid 1980s,
I was struck by the variation of opinion among computing
educators on exactly what constitutes computation and therefore
what topics we should teach our students. Today’s consensus
replaces yesterday’s diversity. Finally, I am amazed at the depth
of understanding about computation that we collectively have
achieved since the 1960s. We have made remarkable progress
toward maturity as a field.
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